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Highlights 
 Clarifies the debate over whether addiction is a disease 
 Compares the clinical and public health perspectives on addiction 
 Argues that addiction is not a ‘brain disease’, in that it involves no brain 
malfunction 
 Normal brain functioning is consistent with the neuropsychological model of 
addiction 
 Addiction can be regarded as a disease on epidemiological grounds 
 From the public health perspective, addiction is a social disorder 




Interdisciplinary study of addiction is facilitated by relative unification of the 
concept. What should be sought is not formal unification through literal analytic 
definition, which would undermine practical flexibility within disciplines and 










should be conceived as a ‘disease’, and over whether addiction is ‘chosen’ behavior, 
are made more difficult to resolve by failure to apply philosophical reflection on 
these general concepts. Such reflection should be sensitive to two kinds of 
constraint: coherence in description of empirical, including neuroscientific, 
observation, and utility in framing normative goals in treatment and policy design. 
Following review of various interpretations of addiction, disease, and choice across 
contributing disciplines, it is concluded that addiction is most plausibly viewed as a 
disease at the scale of public health research and policy, but not personal (e.g. 
clinical) management and intervention. Addicts must make choices to recover, and 
in that respect addiction is a ‘disorder of choice’. However, it is concluded that the 
most relevant sense of ‘disorder’ arises at the social rather than the personal scale.  
Keywords: addiction; addiction as disease; addiction as chosen; neuroscience of 
addiction; public health; epidemiological models of disease; engineered addictive 
environments 
1. Introduction 
The concept of addiction is typical of elements of conceptual fields from applied, 
practically motivated sciences (e.g., engineering, economics, medical sciences) in 
being simultaneously regulated by two relatively independent sets of constraints. 
First, such concepts should serve coherence in description of empirical phenomena. 
Second, they should contribute to utility in supporting shared framing of normative 
goals. Such concepts tend to resist formal theoretical regimentation  of the kind 
often sought by philosophers of science. That is, unpalatable trade-offs between the 
two sets of constraints governing concepts in practical sciences are likely to be 
forced by attempts to provide across-the-board necessary and sufficient conditions 
for their application. There is nevertheless value in trying to make them sufficiently 
coherent across contexts to avoid rampant confusion. Sometimes this is 
straightforward. The mechanical engineer and the contemporary theoretical 
physicist do not mean the same thing by the concepts of ‘mass’ they employ, but the 
relationship between the engineer’s usage inherited from classical physics and the 
concept as reframed by Einstein can be stated precisely. In other instances, where 
concepts lack formal specification, tensions between a concept’s fitness-of-purpose 
for scientific generalization and for application in the hospital or the factory can be 
at best partially resolved, and context may be ineliminably required for 
disambiguation. 
The concept of ‘addiction’ is an instance of the second kind. For most of its history 
the concept has had no scientific usage. Recently, as reflected in the latest (2013) 
edition of the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Medical Disorders 5, it has been introduced because, as a result of neuroscientific 
discoveries over the past three decades, it has come to be regarded as characterizing 
a generalizable condition generated by a distinctive and characteristic pattern in 
neural learning. Clearly, neuroscientists do not and should not require that their 
concept incorporate application criteria that arose through folk practice when most 










insistence that the practical concept be reduced to the neuroscientific one, with 
aspects that don’t fit this regimentation being eliminated from consideration, would 
undermine best clinical and health policy practice. Consequently, tolerance of 
conceptual pluralism should be encouraged. However, widespread assumptions that 
addiction should be understood univocally across contexts have resulted in 
confused debates. I will concentrate on the two controversies that have excited the 
most attention, in terms of popular and academic airtime, and intensity of opposed 
views. 
 
The first of these controversies is the debate over whether addiction is or is not a 
‘disease’, under conditions where there is even less clarity on what diseases are 
taken to be than there is about addiction. ‘Disease’, I will argue, is itself another 
concept freighted with ineliminable context-sensitivity. The second controversy has 
arisen from a well motivated concern to minimize social stigmatization and 
moralized blaming of addicts. Such stigmatization is widely agreed to be 
counterproductive where social welfare is concerned, and to increase the frequency 
with which people are treated cruelly. But this debate, often framed in terms of 
whether addiction is chosen behavior, has also been muddied by careless semantics.  
My aim, from my perspective as a philosopher of science and a behavioral economist, 
is to make progress in stating more clearly what we should see ourselves as aiming 
to fix when we set out to design policies and strategies to reduce the severity and 
frequency of harmful consequences of addiction. I will proceed as follows. In Section 
2 I will identify and criticize widespread ambiguities around what it means to affirm 
or deny that addiction is a disease. In Section 3 I will focus on similar, and related, 
confusions surrounding arguments over whether addictions are ‘disorders of choice’ 
[1]. Section 4 will derive implications from these discussions for a unified scientific, 
clinical, and public health perspective on addiction. 
2. Addiction as a disease 
The currently widespread conception of addiction as a disease, by both a large part 
of the (Western-influenced) public and by dominant clinical and scientific research 
institutions,1 has been criticized by a range of commentators [2, 1, 3, 4].2 In 
                                                        
1 Lewis [4] surveys the extent of this dominance in the American context. 
Unambiguous assertion that addiction is a disease of the brain is attributed to the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the American Medical Association (AMA), 
the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM), and the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH). See also https://www.centeronaddiction.org/what-
addiction/addiction-disease . Outside the USA the front is less monolithic. The 
World Health Organisation (WHO) avoids both the words “disease” and “disorder”, 











particular, Lewis [4] combines polite but intense polemical force with sound 
understanding of the neuroscience and genetics that provide the primary scientific 
evidence cited by disease model proponents. Lewis is not a revisionist about this 
evidence, and what I will say about it here broadly accords with his account. 
However, as with Heyman [1], Lewis’s rejection of the disease model is based mainly 
on what he sees as its pernicious clinical consequences, which are that it impairs 
many addicts’ prospects for recovery by undermining their agency and sense of 
empowerment, while trading off moral stigmatization for stigmatization associated 
with allegedly chronic disability. Thus his argument and conclusion, which I regard 
as sound, are fundamentally normative. However, conceptual practice in science, 
even in practically motivated sciences such as medical research, is not driven 
exclusively by reference to implications for human welfare; there are also empirical 
constraints to be respected. Furthermore, as I will argue, welfare considerations 
extend more broadly than the domain of clinical practice. 
Relationships between the concepts of addiction and disease are historically 
complex, inevitably so in light of the fact that the two concepts have separately 
tangled histories on their own. ‘Addiction’ in English originally meant ‘enslavement’. 
Thus its gradual application to the condition of a person who is behaviorally and 
emotionally preoccupied with a narcotic substance encoded the idea of capture and 
control by an exogenous force. Similarly, many diseases, and especially diseases 
affecting behavioral and emotional stability, were historically regarded in all human 
cultures of which there is a relevant record as involving, at least in part, control by 
demons, offended ancestors, or enemies practising dark arts. There is thus a sense 
in which a ‘disease model of addiction’ predates, across cultures, the contemporary, 
scientifically inflected, concept of disease.  
On the other hand, models of disease as exogenously caused by natural agents have 
been less associated with addiction. In cultures directly or indirectly influenced by 
Galen, many diseases were long regarded as consequences of natural miasma. There 
is no salient record of association between drug dependence or its associated 
consequences and miasma. When miasma were later supplanted in clinical and 
general understanding by germs, these new natural exogenous carriers of disease 
were likewise not hypothesized to be factors for addiction. 
In the twentieth century, as the previously black box of endogenous causal dynamics 
of biological systems and anatomical change was opened by geneticists, 
immunologists, and neuroscientists, the prevailing concept of disease was widened. 
The founders of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) in the 1930s became convinced that 
alcohol addiction was associated with allergy [7], and this mistaken conviction is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 I cite critics who focus specifically on addiction, setting aside more radical 
perspectives according to which the entire idea of psychiatric disease is problematic 
[5, 6]. In calling this perspective ‘radical’ I intend no skepticism about its legitimacy. 
Indeed, properly contextualized I have much sympathy with it. I set it aside here 










still reflected in recent editions of the Big Book circulated as an inspirational manual 
by some AA chapters. Subsequently, of course, vulnerability to addiction came more 
plausibly to be hypothesized to involve a genetic contribution, identification of 
which is a currently active research program [8]. As will be discussed below, there is 
no necessary connection between such research and conceptions of addiction as a 
disease.  
If we take some critical distance from entrenched conceptual associations, we might 
see it as puzzling that scientifically inflected disease models of addiction have been 
preoccupied almost exclusively with hypothesized endogenous sources. After all, 
alcohol addiction, opiate addiction, nicotine addiction, etc., involve patently obvious 
exogenous causal factors. But equally obviously, alcohol, opiates, nicotine, etc., are 
not sufficient causal factors, since almost all adult humans are actually or potentially 
exposed to them, while relatively few become addicts. The hypothesis of a genetic 
basis, like the AA founders’ conjecture of an immunological basis, posits an 
endogenous source of vulnerability to develop an ‘addictive disease’ conditional on 
exposure to an exogenous trigger. Still, we might wonder about the source of the 
assumption that vulnerability must have an endogenous basis. No one would regard 
it as a conceptual problem for the ‘disease model’ of skin cancer if it were, 
counterfactually, the case that all people were equally statistically likely to develop 
it conditional on extended exposure to strong sunlight. It would be regarded as 
uncontroversial that vulnerability to the disease was a function of variation on 
exogenous factors such as working outdoors and living in hot climates.  
A key disanalogy between an environmentally driven cancer vulnerability and 
vulnerability to addiction arises in the fact that cancer symptoms, once triggered, 
persist unless removed by an intervention, whereas those symptoms caused directly 
by an addictive target tend to disappear unless the target is continuously 
administered. So, drunkenness is a symptom of alcohol addiction, but most alcohol 
addicts are only drunk some of the time, and would cease to be drunk at all if they 
stopped inflicting the cause on themselves. But addiction is taken to be a standing 
condition that persists during periods of sobriety; and where there are symptoms 
that don’t fade between episodes - in some cases, for example, tremors – these are 
not part of the direct etiology of the other symptoms. Thus it is supposed that ‘the 
disease itself’ must reside in standing conditions that cause drinking, which in turn 
cause most of the salient but intermittent symptoms. Furthermore, the conditions 
themselves must be non-standard or abnormal states, if they are to account for the 
difference between an addict and a non-addict. 
As Heyman [1] emphasizes, it is crucial to the contemporary disease model of 
addiction as a distinctive model that addiction is widely held to be a chronic 
condition that persists even while an addict successfully maintains abstinence, as 
this seems to imply the existence of a standing endogenous cause of potential 
relapse. The view of addiction as chronic is a central feature of the AA ideology, 
acceptance of which is promoted as itself an essential part of treatment 









can be managed but never cured. The immunological conjecture of AA’s founders fit 
comfortably with this ideology, since all allergies were once chronic conditions and 
many still are. Furthermore, allergies are uncontroversially abnormal, in the sense 
of being departures from the functional contributions to survival and reproduction 
that immune systems were selected by natural selection to make.3  
Genetic profiles are standing structures, though their functional and biochemical 
expression varies with an organism’s life stages and circumstances. But research on 
genetic correlates of addiction is not expected by most researchers to ultimately 
isolate a single responsible gene or cluster that represents an evolutionary ‘mistake’ 
in the sense of unequivocal dysfunctionality. The relationship between genes and 
complex phenotypical patterns like addictive behavior are simply not that simple 
[9]; and, in general, diseases can only be identified with genes that directly cause 
debilitating developmental outcomes before adulthood, since most other genes that 
reduce expected fitness in some circumstances promote it in others. Questions 
about how many different genetic configurations contribute to vulnerability to 
addiction, and to what extent in each case, are generating useful and potentially 
practically significant discoveries, but are independent of the question as to whether 
addiction is best conceptualized as a disease. 
The most common basis for contemporary disease models of addiction among 
scientists and treatment professionals is appeal to characteristic neuroadaptations 
observed in addicts. For compactness of discussion I will discuss these as they have 
been revealed in neuropsychological research on gambling addicts. Ross et al [10] 
argue that where the functional neuroscience of addiction is concerned, gambling 
addiction, the only purely behavioral dependence currently acknowledged as 
addictive in the DSM 5 [11], should be regarded as exemplifying the basic 
mechanism, because it involves no compounding exogenous neurochemical effects 
specific to particular ingested drugs. After reviewing the high-level neuroscience of 
gambling addiction, I will comment briefly on how this same general pattern is 
triggered by some substances. Crucial for the relevance of this discussion to the 
disease conception of addiction will be distinguishing between the neurofunctional 
structures that render people susceptible to addiction, and the neurofunctional 
effects of addictive consumption (that is, neuroadaptations). 
What makes some forms of gambling – slot machines, roulette, video poker, but not 
poker played against a table of other people – potentially addictive is that the games 
in question involve sequences of statistically independent events that frequently 
yield reinforcing rewards and can be generated by simple, stereotyped actions on 
the part of the player. Three general facts about the architecture of the brain’s 
reward learning mechanism turn this into a potential behavioral trap. 
                                                        
3 The non-functional meaning of ‘abnormal’, statistical scarcity, is not the relevant 
concept here. An allergy would remain a dysfunction even if the majority of the 
population suffered from it. Conversely, many statistically rare conditions, such as 










First, the dopamine-based neural learning circuit projecting from ventral striatum 
directs allocation of cognitive and emotional attention and makes and tests 
predictions of reward as a single, integrated process. Thus any actions that deliver 
information pertinent to adjustment of reward predictions are hard not to attend to 
and be aroused by.  
Second, the ventral striatal circuit learns according to an algorithm, a specific form 
of Rescorla-Wagner learning, which cannot settle on a model of genuine 
randomness [12]. Thus it cannot draw the conclusion that further testing of reward 
predictions by additional gambles is not delivering any new information about 
estimated priors.  
Third, the wider neural environment in which the striatal learning mechanism is 
embedded is built to help the organism efficiently harvest reward when its attention 
is strongly focused, its motivation is aroused, and easily executed probes of the 
external environment seem to be delivering steady learning opportunities. The 
signal for this is phasic dopamine concentration in nucleus accumbens. The brain 
facilitates reward harvesting by cueing motor preparation for the activity that 
delivers the information that is the focus of attention. Somatic cravings are the 
subjective experience of such motor preparation in the absence of opportunity for 
action. The cravings cue thoughts about gambling, and the thoughts sustain 
attention and motor preparation, so there is self-sustaining feedback. This generates 
one of the most aversive aspects of addiction, the crowding out of alternative 
attentional foci by thoughts about gambling. The gambling addict who is trying to 
concentrate on work, family, friends, or recreation is distracted by intrusive 
thoughts about gambling and by somatic discomfort. Hence she experiences relief 
when she succumbs and goes to the casino or the video terminal. This relief will 
tend to automatically be interpreted as escape from work or family problems – in 
typical cases the very problems caused in the first place by preoccupation with 
gambling. In extreme cases she “enters the zone” [13], the American gambling 
addicts’ phrase for the phenomenology of having her behavior completely and 
effortlessly controlled by the dopaminergic mechanism. 
Addictive drugs share the basic features of the syndrome just described [14]. That is, 
all such drugs ‘convince’ the striatal dopaminergic system that an opportunity for 
efficient reward learning is at hand, that attention should therefore be focused on 
the opportunity and on cues that become associated with it (including thoughts 
about it), and all thereby ‘convince’ the brain as a whole to condition the motor 
system to prepare to harvest the reward, thus inducing cravings and preoccupation. 
In all cases, the basic signal triggering the syndrome is concentration of phasic 
dopamine in nucleus accumbens [15]. This common pattern can be obscured if one 
focuses on differences among the specific pathways by which addictive drugs 
generate this concentration. Stimulant drugs such as cocaine and amphetamines 
inhibit reuptake of dopamine after it has facilitated synaptic transfer. Opiates recruit 
additional mechanisms, mu-opioid receptors, in the ventral tegmental area and 










brain. Since GABA neurons inhibit dopaminergic neurons in ventral tegmental area, 
the second-order result of GABAergic inhibition is a flood of dopamine into nucleus 
accumbens. An alternative causal path to this inhibition promoted by some 
addictive drugs is reduction of tonic serotonin 5-HT in pre-frontal areas. Alcohol 
additionally promotes mu-opioid receptors. One way of understanding what all of 
these drugs are doing, in their different ways, is introducing noise into the signals by 
which the overall system registers the timing of reward delivery. Since neural 
learning involves prediction of, and adjustment in response to misprediction of, 
both the magnitude and the timing of rewards, disruption of the clock against which 
timing is measured results in attempted learning that never resolves by identifying a 
stable model. 
According to this account of the neural basis of addiction, we find no antecedent 
condition in the brain of the addict that could be regarded as a disorder. The striatal 
reward learning circuit was selected to associate the organism’s actions with 
opportunities for learning about the magnitudes and timing of rewards. Confronted 
with a slot machine, the system responds in the way that has contributed to the 
success of the organism’s ancestors. Of course the response is not optimal given 
current conditions, since it fails to learn that there is no regular relationship 
between any one play of the machine and another. But the explanation for this is 
straightforward: genuinely random, as opposed to merely stochastic, processes are 
vanishingly rare in nature, so ability to predict, and hence to detect, such processes 
was not selected for. Suboptimality per se is not indicative of disorder. 
Perhaps, however, we might locate disorder in the neuroadaptation that 
characterizes the passage from learning to gamble to ‘true’ addiction. The brightest 
line in this learning continuum is crossed when pre-frontal signals that normally 
inhibit direct triggering of motor preparation cells from ventral striatum begin to 
attenuate. As noted, this is the basis of craving and preoccupation, which in turn 
make it much more difficult for the addicted person to implement deliberate 
decisions to abstain or cut down. Furthermore, this is the functional change that 
makes it possible to identify addicts by non-behavioral means, in neuroimaging 
probes. This is the only state of the individual addict’s brain that could reasonably 
be regarded as disordered. Though conceptualizing the neuroadaptation as a 
disorder might have sound practical purposes and is arguably semantically natural, 
let us first note two restrictions on regarding it as the basis for attributing a disease. 
First, the condition results from the brain undergoing a normal learning process, 
adaptive under circumstances encountered in the ancestral past, to an engineered 
novelty, the slot machine, designed deliberately to make the addictive 
neuroadaptation more likely [13]. In this respect, the disorder closely resembles the 
obesity of a person whose unhealthy state results from her eating sugar and 
carbohydrates when they are available, just as her ancestors were selected to do, 
but who lives in an environment where the most inexpensive calories on offer are 










Second, we have no empirical grounds for hypothesizing a basis in genetic variation 
for the addict’s brain to have been statistically unusually predisposed to undergo 
the neuroadaptation. If we are persuaded, following the authors in MacKillop and 
Munafó [8], that the observed correlation between some genetic markers and 
addiction involves an intermediate phenotype, we do not know whether the risk 
that is genetically promoted is for gambling conditional on opportunities, or for 
relatively rapid and entrenched neuroadaptation conditional on gambling. For that 
matter, the relevant risk might be for some conceptually remote disposition that 
makes the person more likely to gamble, if she gambles, with slot machines than 
with some less dangerous instrument such as cards. 
The point above does not constitute criticism of the intermediate phenotype 
approach to addiction vulnerability. For many public health purposes, fine details of 
mechanism specification are unimportant, depending on which elements of causal 
relationships are most amenable to effective policy intervention. The recent history 
of the relationship between problem gambling research and policy response is 
exemplary where this issue is concerned, and offers important insight into what is at 
stake when we decide whether to conceptualize addiction as a disease, and when we 
deliberate about what we might best specifically intend by such conceptualization. 
A large proportion of the first generation of problem gambling research was funded 
by national ‘responsible gambling’ agencies in various countries that in turn were 
financed through voluntary or mandatory contributions from casinos and 
(sometimes) lottery operators. Relationships between these agencies and 
researchers have usually been effectively arm’s-length, as required and overseen by 
university research ethics committees and institutional review boards. However, 
many in the research community have become convinced that this structure of 
research support has contributed to a specific systemic bias [16, 17, 18]. 
‘Responsible gambling’ public information campaigns promote the idea that 
gambling is harmless recreation for most participants, but that for a small, ex ante 
vulnerable, minority it is dangerous. Researchers drawn into policy conversations 
structured around responsible gambling thus tended to concentrate on trying to 
quantity and identify this at risk sub-population. Much early work consisted of 
national and provincial /state prevalence studies, using screens designed for clinical 
diagnosis such as, initially, the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) [19], and, later, 
the Canadian Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) [20]. As reviewed by 
Williams, Volberg, and Stevens [21], these studies reported problem gambling 
prevalence rates in the range of 0.5% to 7.6%, but strongly skewed toward the 
lower end and averaging 2.3%. Such findings comported comfortably with the 
‘responsible gambling’ framework. 
Significant limitations of the framework from the public health perspective have 
emerged, however.  Where the more rigorously calibrated PGSI is concerned, the 
operationalization of ‘at risk’ refers to the risk that a survey respondent, based on 
status at the time of the survey, would be classified as a problem gambler on the 










understanding of risk, which aims to identify the distribution and frequency of 
prospective risk of development of a condition in a population. Most prevalence 
studies have used diagnostic-stem (‘trigger’) questions that allow surveyors to avoid 
annoying respondents who have said they do not gamble by then asking them 
batteries of questions about specific aspects of their gambling. However, as Harrison, 
Lau, and Ross (HLR) [22] show in re-analyses of selected large prevalence studies 
using advanced statistical estimation methods, this apparently sensible practice 
creates sample selection bias that results in massive underestimation of problem 
gambling prevalence on the PGSI operationalization of risk, and even greater 
underestimation of prospective risk. The largest problem gambling prevalence 
study conducted to date, incorporated in one wave of he National Epidemiologic 
Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) in the United States [23], 
reported population prevalence of 1.3%. When HLR apply best-practice 
econometric sample-selection bias correction to the data, using the same 
conceptualization of risk, they estimate the population prevalence at 7.7%. 
This analysis highlights what I regard as the most important complication facing 
critics who reject application of the concept of disease to addiction altogether. 
‘Disease’ is not a concept over which clinicians and the researchers focused on 
serving them can claim exclusive ‘ownership’. Arguably, in fact, this community has 
no need in the first place for a scientifically regimented concept of disease, since 
their mission calls upon them to apply their characteristic interventions, including 
pharmaceutical interventions, wherever they have evidence that these can relieve 
patient distress of any kind (and are in addition ethically appropriate). By contrast, 
public health researchers require rigorous models of characteristic epidemiological 
patterns. To the extent that a condition that reduces public health spreads by 
contagion, manifesting statistical patterns originally identified by study of classic 
vector-borne diseases, public policy interventions can be effectively modeled 
epidemiologically [24]. Recent examples include obesity [25] – and narcotic use for 
recreation and/or psychological self-medication [26]. 
I conjecture, based on unsystematic reading, that most epidemiologists would not 
wish to insist that unhealthy behavioral patterns at population scale such as obesity 
and addiction are ‘diseases’ in more than a metaphorical sense. But it not clear that 
the relevant distinction where scientific discourse is concerned is between the 
metaphorical and the literal; what is arguably more important is the distinction 
between casual and technically specialized concepts. From that point of view, there 
is a philosophical case to be made that (i) the only technical regimentation of the 
disease concept in the scientific literature is the epidemiologist’s; and that (ii) if the 
concept is empirically identified in the best models of a phenomenon that 
undermines public health, then the concept will be applied. Whether some 
applications are called ‘metaphorical’ may signal nothing more than the fact that the 
applications in question are novel. It is the nature of the dynamics of concept 
innovation in science that technically applicable ‘metaphors’ come, as it were, pre-
frozen. There is not yet a preponderance of clear evidence that any specific 










The point is that this open empirical prospect is likely to play a more decisive role 
than the normative opinions of clinicians in determining whether campaigns to stop 
conceptualizing addiction as a disease are ultimately successful. 
Some further qualification is in order here. Notwithstanding philosophers’ 
tendencies to want to serve as universalizing conceptual janitors, cross-disciplinary 
conceptual pluralism is a common phenomenon. It might turn out to be natural and 
sensible to say that addiction is a disease from the perspective of public health but is 
best not handled in the clinical context according to the standard protocols of 
medicalized conditions, i.e., diseases in the non-technical sense. 
Further reflection on our main example of gambling addiction suggests that this 
relatively simple bifurcation of conceptual practice might still be too simple. A 2010 
prevalence study of problem gambling in large South African cities [27] did not use a 
diagnostic-stem question, and thus allows for meaningful comparison of population 
prevalences of more and less severe manifestations of gambling problems according 
to the PGSI operationalization of risk. Approximately 3% of the sample were found 
to be at high risk for clinical diagnosis, while approximately 18% were assigned risk 
scores of >0. Kincaid et al [28] performed a taxometric analysis of these data, and 
found that a distinct taxon emerged at the upper end of the risk distribution if PGSI 
scoring criteria were made more stringent, according to a rule that reduced the 
high-risk group to approximately 2%. The authors speculate, on the basis of 
secondary data from the study, that this taxon might mark the sub-population that is 
‘truly’ addicted, in the sense of having relatively entrenched neuroadaptation to 
gambling and relative recalcitrance to intervention.  
Let us consider the suggested pluralistic approach to application of the disease 
concept in light of these data. From a public health perspective, the welfare loss 
expected to be associated with the 19% of the ‘at-risk’ taxon who are conjectured to 
not be ‘truly addicted’ is likely to be substantially greater than that expected to be 
associated with the ‘truly addicted’ taxon, and so is likely to be the more efficient 
target for intervention if resource scarcity calls for triage at the policy level [29, 22]. 
Furthermore, and more importantly in the present context, only the larger taxon is 
likely to be sufficiently widely distributed to support application of an 
epidemiological model. However, if a medicalized response model, particularly one 
involving in-patient care supported by pharmaceuticals, were to be applied 
anywhere it would be to people in the smaller taxon. These reflections on real data 
for policy certainly do not directly pull a rug out from under Lewis’s view. After all, 
his opinion is that the disease model does not apply to addiction at the clinical and 
individual patient scale, period. But the case does lead us to recognize how 
profoundly disunified the disease concept might be in practice on the pluralistic 
interpretation: according to it, in the instance at hand the most plausible targets for 
application of the clinical concept of disease are precisely those to whom the public 
health concept of disease might not apply. 
The general conclusion of the discussion to this point is that debates over whether 









itself is a context-sensitive and relatively unstructured concept. The most important 
reasons for caution in applying it to addiction involve normative assessment of the 
consequences for addicts, not the implications for scientific clarity. As will be seen in 
Section 4, however, the discussion of the disease conception, conjoined with 
reflections on addicts’ agency in Section 3, will help to shed light on a less elusive 
and more important question, on the kind of disorder that addiction exemplifies, and 
that justifies motivation for interventions. 
3. Is addictive behavior chosen? 
Defenses of the conception of addiction as a disease almost always include the claim 
that this undermines its moralization and cultural tendencies to stigmatize and 
blame addicts [4]. The alleged basis for this is that if the addict is taken to be in the 
grip of a disease, then she is less likely to be thought to have chosen her condition 
and its consequences. Reflection on unambiguous cases of diseases that typically 
result from voluntary behavior, such as HIV/AIDS, should remind us that the 
effectiveness of this argument is likely to be limited. 
There are two different senses in which addicts are often held responsible for their 
addictions. That addicts typically choose the behavior that triggers their addiction is 
disputed only by skeptics about free will in general.4 Where this is the intended 
sense of responsibility, the question of whether a disease model is maintained is 
logically irrelevant, unless the model incorporates a scientifically unsupported 
doctrine of strong genetic determinism specifically about addiction. Policy-relevant 
debate instead focuses on whether addicts choose to be addicted. The most common 
narrative associated with addiction as a chosen condition is that addicts make series 
of discrete choices to go on consuming addictive targets even when they have 
become aware that such choices maintain their addiction. Their continuing 
addiction can consequently be held to manifest weakness of willpower. In response 
to this, a disease model is often invoked to emphasize that paralysis of will is a non-
chosen consequence of addiction, in roughly the sense that paralysis of limbs might 
be a consequence of a stroke. People do not suppose that stroke victims choose not 
to walk, even in cases where they believe that the stroke itself was caused by chosen 
behavior. 
As with concepts of disease, both popular and scientific concepts of choice feature 
heterogeneity. However, whereas the concept of disease is analytically specified 
only in epidemiology, alternative choice concepts have been rigorously modeled 
within disciplines that respectively deploy them [30]. Parts of cognitive science 
dominated by computational psychologists and philosophers often associate choice 
with conscious deliberation. On this conception, addicts can straightforwardly be 
held not to choose addictive behavior if it is thought to be generally caused by 
subconscious, automatic processes. By contrast, economists (other than those 
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behavioral economists who are distinguished precisely by their embrace of 
conceptual frameworks borrowed from psychology) deploy a less stringent concept 
of choice, according to which a course of behavior counts as chosen just in case it is 
modifiable by incentives. On this conception, empirical evidence speaks decisively in 
favor of addictive behavior as chosen: addictive consumption is clearly sensitive to 
changes in costs and benefits [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 1 - pp. 65-88]. 
Literatures on the relationship between choice and responsibility are enormous. I 
refer to “literatures” because there is more than one, linked to one another in the 
scientific network only by a few relatively isolated nodes. Economists and some 
philosophers have generated a large cluster of theoretical work that is preoccupied 
with the extent to which addictive choice satisfies application conditions for various 
models of objective rationality; Elster and Skog [38] provide a representative 
sample of such research. It derives such policy relevance as it has from its 
connection to concerns about paternalism: to the extent that some behavior is 
regarded as potentially or actually rational, thought in the liberal tradition inclines 
to the view that it should be regulated only with respect to externalities it generates. 
I will here set these disputes aside on grounds that they are tangential to the 
question of how we should best conceptualize addiction in the first place, and 
because where policy and intervention are concerned they are directly relevant only 
to the relatively small subset of addicts who are content to remain addicts, or who 
believe that any potential modification of their behavior they might choose is no one 
else’s business. 
Fortunately there is a growing literature that interprets relationships between 
choice and responsibility more broadly and flexibly. In this literature, technical and 
a priori standards of rationality are replaced by a naturalistic understanding of 
intelligibility by reference to actual, varying, interpersonal and cultural standards. 
Pioneering work of this kind stems from Ainslie [39, 40], who emphasizes the 
typical drama of addiction as revolving around maintenance of ‘personal rules’. 
These are principles by which people maintain levels of consistency and 
predictability in their choices that constitute dynamic equilibria between social 
expectations that are applied to them, and their own preferred points of trade-off 
between stability and adventure. The dynamics of personal-rule maintenance are, 
on Ainslie’s account, the phenomena to which people refer when they deploy the 
simplified cultural construct of ‘willpower’. 
The pernicious aspect of addiction, Ainslie argues, is that its characteristic 
neurodynamics undermine addicts’ confidence in their ability to maintain personal 
rules. A smoker, for example, might decide that smoking is no longer consistent with 
the sort of person she wishes to be, in light of her own passage through her life-cycle 
and shifting social standards of health with which she identifies. Nicotine addiction, 
however, might then set up unanticipated challenges for her. On one typical pattern, 
she might form a personal rule to become abstinent, but then discover that because 
of the neuroadaptations her smoking has caused, her policy requires a level of self-









pattern that is also common, she might design a rule to smoke only while drinking 
and socializing, and then find that her addiction leads her to over-exploit this 
loophole and spend unsustainable time in the pub. Ainslie refers to his model of 
personal-rule dynamics as ‘picoeconomics’, because he formally frames it in terms 
of alternative patterns of ‘bundling’ of the objects of reward (e.g. a sequence of 
discrete smoking experiences versus a year’s self-permission to smoke) that effect 
curvatures of revealed intertemporal discount rates. But the picoeconomics label 
can be motivated more generally where addiction is concerned, simply by observing 
that addiction systematically and significantly shifts the relative costs of different 
personal rules [41, 42].  
Ainslie is a psychiatrist, and his work within that disciplinary frame has been 
relatively narrowly focused on the phenomenology of self-control, framed for 
incorporation into behavioral economics. However, I referred to it as ‘pioneering’ 
because a philosophical literature has subsequently developed that carefully 
interprets normative responsibility in terms of constructs more or less identical to 
Ainslie’s ‘personal rules’ [43, 44, 45]. This emerging perspective is nicely 
synthesised by Ismael [46], into what she calls a ‘self-governance model of 
personhood’ (SGP). According to the model, persons are constructed through 
natural social dynamics that are driven by pressures to distribute, reward, and 
sanction responsibility, and a human individual achieves and maintains personhood 
to the extent that she judges herself, and is judged by others, to govern herself well 
with respect to the responsibilities she acknowledges. Everyday conflicts among 
values ensure that such personhood is an ideal against which everyone falls short. 
But we treat as mental disorders standing conditions of people’s brains that 
seriously undermine their capacity for self-governance. Addiction is a leading such 
disorder; and the mechanism by which it interferes with responsibility is essentially 
identical to that previously identified by Ainslie, though Ismael does not cite him. 
We can interpret the most common life-cycle of addiction in terms of picoeconomics 
and the SGP. 
Addiction begins with escalating frequency of use and dosage sizes over periods of 
months or years, usually beginning in adolescence or early adulthood. The majority 
of drug addicts either become abstinent or develop controlled use (which, contrary 
to crude variants of the disease model, is not rare) in middle age [1]. Self-engineered 
recovery is significantly less frequent in addicts who suffer from co-occurring 
psychiatric disorders such as major depression. As this group of addicts is over-
represented in clinical samples, Heyman [1] argues that the image of addiction as an 
intractable, chronic condition is based on the salience of convenient clinical 
populations in prevalence and treatment research. At the same time, controlling for 
age, relapses among recovered addicts lead to faster escalation of use frequency and 
dosage than is observed in the early stages of dependency among people without 
addiction histories. This indicates that the reward circuits of recovered addicts do 
not entirely forget their training. This is the element of truth in the otherwise false 










Addicts’ efforts, between onset and recovery, to escape from their addictions can 
typically be framed as attempts to regain personal governance. The normal process 
that eventually leads to abstinence or stable and controlled consumption is one of 
discovery of effective personal rules. Addicts experience their initial unsuccessfully 
maintained personal rules as failures that undermine their confidence in themselves. 
However, the high rate of recovery, which applies to the majority who never receive 
clinical assistance, and the fact that eventual success follows an average of seven 
‘serious’ campaigns for control, each ending in relapse [1], is evidence that these 
failures are occasions for learning. Attempted personal rules are typically 
modifications of previous ones that add explicit patches to what are perceived as 
design flaws in the prototypes. For example, the gambling addict may try to limit 
casino visits to the first Friday after payday, then have the rule collapse because she 
finds herself framing every bonus earning, including those where she can influence 
the timing, as paydays. This might lead her to launch a new control campaign after 
she has arranged with her employer to defer all of her accrued bonuses into an 
annual extra payment. In general, the most effective kind of personalized assistance 
that can be provided to addicts is to direct their cognitive attention to the trial-and-
error learning provided by their unsuccessful personal rules. This seems to 
eventually convince most addicts that self-governance, however diminished it has 
become for them, is not altogether eroded and thus has potential to be strengthened. 
Personal addiction, on this account, is a consequence, grounded in neural reward 
learning, of sequences of choices, at least some of which are consequences of 
personal rules that are poorly adapted to the ecology of available rewards in the 
person’s environment. It emerges as a disorder with respect to social, psychological 
and economic expectation of self-governance. It is not a disorder ‘of the brain’, in the 
sense that no part of the addict’s brain is directly damaged by addictive 
neuroadaptation (though of course it might be damaged by alcohol, or pulmonary 
disease from tobacco, or the baseball bats of the gambling provider’s goons), and no 
part of the brain is malfunctioning with respect to its evolutionary proper function.5 
Addicts typically choose to become un-addicted, and successfully implement this 
choice, but only through trial-and-error learning of personal rules that are better 
adapted to their environments. They typically rely quite heavily on assistance in this 
learning from family and close friends. A lucky minority get further useful help from 
therapists and clinicians. 
4. Addiction as a disorder of society 
The characterization of personal addiction just given emphasizes negative welfare 
effects that result from the normal functioning of the reward learning systems of the 
brain in certain modern environments. In closing I will direct attention to these 
environments. 
All mammals share similar neural reward circuits, so all are in principle vulnerable 
to addictive neuroadaptation, though non-humans cannot in addition suffer from 
                                                        









undermined personhood. Indeed, much of the crucial evidence concerning addictive 
neuroadaptation is derived from experiments with rats [15]. Natural selection 
tolerated this vulnerability because the kind of environmental contingency that 
triggers addiction does not arise naturally. When wild elephants or baboons 
encounter low-toxicity sources of alcohol, for example berries that occasionally 
ferment on the vine, they indulge in benders that they evidently find sufficiently 
rewarding to tolerate (at least in the case of baboons) significantly enhanced 
predation risk while drunk. They are at no risk of addiction, however, because they 
cannot cultivate sources of low-toxicity alcohol. Their parties are windfalls, the 
frequency of which they cannot influence. 
Modern humans encounter addiction in large numbers because they can engineer 
addictive environments. Where most addictive targets – particularly alcohol – are 
concerned, they have not engineered these environments for the sake of their 
addictive properties. Stockpiled alcohol has provided a range of enhancements to 
human welfare for millennia [48], which are traded off against non-zero frequency 
of alcohol addiction. Contemporary corporate producers of alcoholic beverages, 
while open to serious ethical criticism for encouraging natural risk-loving behavior 
in young people, do not attempt to engineer higher rates of addiction per se. 
Producers and vendors of various other addictive targets, however, enjoy profits 
that are directly driven by their deliberate design and continuous, research-driven 
‘improvement’ of addictive environments. This has clearly been the core business 
model of the cigarette industry since its inception [49]. And the intentional fostering 
of increased rates of gambling induction is the currently dominant dynamic in the 
commercial gambling industry. As documented by Schüll [13], each successive short 
generation of electronic gaming machine (EGM) technology has been engineered to 
make the player’s experience more addictive. Particularly effective in this regard are 
multiple paylines, each carrying only a small stake on a given play, that fully engage 
the gambler’s cognitive resources, thereby drawing her quickly and deeply into ‘the 
zone’, and that produce continuous strings of small wins to maximally arouse 
dopamine circuit response. Of course, the sum of small wins is smaller in 
expectation than the sum of small losses. The massive displacement of traditional 
gambling forms by EGMs on casino floors in Las Vegas, Macau, and elsewhere, is 
strong indicative evidence of the profit increases being derived from engineered 
addiction. 
As discussed in Section 2, here, at the epidemiologist’s population scale, is where we 
might unambiguously locate disease and disorder – social disease and disorder. I 
argued that if someone prefers to regard application of these concepts at the public 
health scale as merely metaphorical, that is largely a matter of rhetoric rather than 
substance. Application of the epidemiological disease concept to addiction is 
compatible with regarding addiction as a phenomenon of inefficient, under-
informed and especially manipulated and exploited choice at the personal scale. 
Empathy with addicts can indeed be based partly on viewing them as victims – not 









As noted earlier, not all addiction is deliberately engineered. Alcohol producers do 
not aim to generate addiction, and makers of traditional cigars are also largely 
innocent of such a charge. However, it remains true to say that almost all human 
addiction is “socially engineered” in the sense that it results from humans’ social 
capacity to manufacture and efficiently distribute flows of addictive products, a 
capacity that could not be selected against in the evolution of the brain. 
I endorse Lewis’s [4] argument against the clinical and therapeutic practice of 
encouraging individual addicts to regard themselves as diseased. Addicts should 
indeed be engaged as agents with active power to regulate the consumption 
patterns that have undermined their autonomy and welfare. At the same time, all 
experts on addiction, scientists, clinicians, and policy designers, should join forces in 
emphasizing that although addiction is influenced by choice, it is seldom chosen 
deliberately, and results from biological vulnerability shared by almost all people. In 
addition, since epidemiologists and public health experts will inevitably frame 
addiction as a disease, whether they regard this framing as literal or metaphorical, it 
is self-defeating communication practice to simply deny that the concepts of disease 
and addiction should be associated. The general public lacks robust distinctions 
between concepts of ‘socially transmitted disease’, ‘virally transmitted disease’, and 
‘developmentally transmitted disease’. In this time when it has never been easier to 
give quick life to new memes via social media, there is particular opportunity if 
experts can reduce the extent to which they talk across one another. This might not 
only encourage better social treatment of already addicted people, but help to focus 
public attention on the form of problem behavior that is fully deliberate: fostering 
addiction  as a business model. 
 
Author statement 
I am the sole author of the paper. 
 
Funding 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
Declarations of interest: none 
 
Acknowledgments 













[1] Heyman, G. (2009). Addiction: A Disorder of Choice. Harvard University Press. 
[2] Fingarette, H. (1989). Heavy Drinking. University of California Press. 
[3] Alexander, B. (2010). The Globalization of Addiction. Oxford University Press. 
[4] Lewis, M. (2015). The Biology of Desire. Public Affairs. 
[5] Watters, E. (2010). Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche. Free 
Press. 
[6] Borsboom, D., Cramer, A., & Kalis, A. (2018). Brain disorders? Not really… Why 
network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 24: 1-54. 
[7] White, W. (1998). Slaying the Dragon: The History of Addiction Treatment and 
Recovery in America. Bloomington: The Chestnut Health Systems / Lighthouse 
Institute.  
[8] MacKillop, J., & Munafó, M., eds. (2013). Genetic Influences on Addiction: An 
Intermediate Phenotype Approach. MIT Press. 
[9] Keller, E. (2000). The Century of the Gene. Harvard University Press. 
[10] Ross, D., Sharp, C., Vuchinich, R., & Spurrett, D. (2008). Midbrain Mutiny: The 
Picoeconomics and Neuroeconomics of Disordered Gambling. MIT Press. 
[11] American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders 5. APA Press. 
[12] Sutton, R., & Barto, A. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. 2nd 
edition. MIT Press. 
[13] Schüll, N.D. (2012). Addiction by Design. Princeton University Press. 
[14] Potenza, M. (2008). The neurobiology of pathological gambling and drug 
addiction: an overview and new findings. Philosophical Transactions of The 
Royal Society B Biological Sciences 363:3181-3189. 
[15] Beninger, R. (2018). Life’s Rewards. Oxford University Press. 
[16] Hancock, L., & Smith, G. (2017). Critiquing the Reno model I-IV: International 
influence on regulators and governments (2004–2015)— the distorted reality 











[17] Abbott, M. (2017). Beyond Reno: A critical commentary on Hancock and Smith. 
International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction 15: 1177-1186. 
[18] Hancock, L. (2011). Regulatory Failure? The Case of Crown Casino. Australian 
Scholarly Publishing. 
[19] Lesieur, H., & Blume, S. (1987). The South Oaks Gambling Screen (The SOGS): A 
new instrument for the identification of problem gamblers. American Journal of 
Psychiatry 144: 1184-1188. 
[20] Ferris, J., & Wynne, H. (2001). The Canadian Problem Gambling Index Final 
Report Canadian Center on Substance Abuse at www.ccsa.ca/pdf/ccsa-008805-
2001.pdf. 
[21] Williams, R., Volberg, R., & Stevens, R. (2012). The Population Prevalence of 
Problem Gambling: Methodological Influences, Standardized Rates, Jurisdictional 
Differences, and Worldwide Trends. Report Prepared for the Ontario Problem 
Gambling Research Centre and the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term 
Care, May 2012; available at 
www.gamblingresearch.org/applydownload.php?docid=12579?. 
[22] Harrison, G., Lau, M., & Ross, D. (2019). The risk of gambling problems in the 
general population: A reconsideration. Journal of Gambling Studies, forthcoming. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10899-019-09897-2 
[23] Kessler, R., Hwang, I., LaBrie, R., Petukhova, M., Sampson, N., Winters, K., & 
Shaffer, H. (2008). DSM-IV Pathological Gambling in the National Comorbidity 
Survey Replication, Psychological Medicine 38: 1351-1360. 
[24] Brockmann D., & Helbing, D. (2013). The hidden geometry of complex, 
network-driven contagion phenomena. Science 342: 1337–1342. 
[25] Huang, H., Yan, Z., Chen, Y., & Liu, F. (2016). A social contagious model of the 
obesity epidemic. Scientific reports 6: 37961. doi:10.1038/srep37961 
[26] Galea, S., Nandi, A., & Vlahov, D. (2004). The social epidemiology of substance 
use. Epidemiology Review 26:36–52. 
[27] Sharp, C., Dellis, A., Hofmeyr, A., Kincaid, H., & Ross, D. (2015). First evidence of 
comorbidity of problem gambling and other psychiatric problems in a 
representative urban sample of South Africa. Journal of Gambling Studies 31: 
679-694. 
[28] Kincaid, H., Daniels, R., Dellis, A., Hofmeyr, A., Rousseau, J., Sharp, C., & Ross, D. 
(2013). A taxometric analysis of problem gambling data from a South African 










[29] Sulkunen, P., Babor, T., Örnberg, J.C., Egerer, M., Hellman, M., Livingstone, C., 
Marionneau, V., Nikkinen, J., Orford, J., Room, R., & Rossow, I. (2019). Setting 
Limits: Gambling, Science, and Public Policy. Oxford University Press. 
[30] Ross, D. (2011). Estranged parents and a schizophrenic child: choice in 
economics, psychology and neuroeconomics. Journal of Economic Methodology 
18: 215-229. 
 
[31] Chaloupka, F. (1991), Rational addictive behavior and cigarette smoking, 
Journal of Political Economy 99: 722-742. 
[32] DeGrandpre, R., Bickel, W., Hughes, J., & Higgins, S. (1992). Behavioral 
economics of drug self-administration: III. A reanalysis of the nicotine 
regulation hypothesis. Psychopharmacology 108: 1-10.  
[33] Leung, S.-F., & Phelps, C. (1993). “My kingdom for a drink . . . ?” A review of the 
estimates of the price sensitivity of demand for alcoholic beverages. In M. Hilton 
and G. Bloss (eds), Economics and the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Problems, 
Rockville, MD: National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Research 
Monograph No. 25. NIH Pub. No. 93-3513; pp. 1-31. 
[34] Carroll, M. (1996). Reducing drug abuse by enriching the environment with 
alternative non-drug reinforcers. In L. Green & J. Kagel (eds), Advances in 
Behavioral Economics: Vol. 3. Substance Use and Abuse, Norwood, NJ: Ablex; pp. 
37-68. 
[35] Bickel, W., Madden, G., & Petry, N. (1998). The price of change: The behavioral 
economics of drug dependence. Behavior Therapy 29: 545-565.  
[36] Chaloupka, F., Grossman, M., & Tauras, J. (1999). The demand for cocaine and 
marijuana by youth. In F. Chaloupka, W. Bickel, M. Grossman, and H. Saffer (eds), 
The Economic Analysis of Substance Use and Abuse: An Integration of Econometric 
and Behavioral Economic Perspectives, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; pp. 
133-156. 
[37] Higgins, S., Heil, S., & Lussier, J. (2004). Clinical implications of reinforcement as 
a determinant of substance use disorders. Annual Reviews of Psychology 55: 
431-461. 
[38] Elster, J., & Skog, O.-J., eds. (1999). Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction. 
Cambridge University Press. 
[39] Ainslie, G. (1992). Picoeconomics. Cambridge University Press. 
[40] Ainslie, G. (2001). Breakdown of Will. Cambridge University Press. 
[41] Bénabou, R., & Triole, J. (2004). Willpower and personal rules. Journal of 










[42] Ross, D. (2010). Economic models of addiction. In D. Ross, H. Kincaid, D. 
Spurrett and P. Collins, eds., What is Addiction? MIT Press, pp. 131-158. 
[43] Keefe, J. (1996). Divided Minds and Successive Selves. MIT Press. 
[44] Velleman, J.D. (2009). How We Get Along. Cambridge University Press. 
[45] Tiberius, V. (2018). Well-Being as Value Fulfillment. Oxford University Press. 
[46] Ismael, J. (2016). How Physics Makes Us Free. Oxford University Press. 
[47] Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. MIT 
Press. 
[48] Hockings, K., & Dunbar, R., eds. (2020). Humans and Alcohol. Oxford University 
Press. 
[49] Brandt, A. (2009). The Cigarette Century. Basic Books. 
 
Jo
ur
na
l P
re
-p
ro
of
